Resumen Propongo que el argumento carrolliano de Quine en “Truth by Convention” no refuta una variedad especialmente genuina de convencionalismo acerca de la lógica. También argumento que la lección carrolliana básica acerca del convencionalismo es que la introducción de convenciones o tesis aceptadas acerca de qué es lógicamente correcto no puede por sí sola instaurar las disposiciones inferenciales correspondientes. Apoyándome en mi discusión del regreso carrolliano, indico finalmente que hay cuando menos ciertos límites carrollianos a la manera en que las “leyes lógicas” podrían ser “sustituidas” y, en contra de ciertas consideraciones de Alberto Moretti, que hay también otros límites no estrictamente carrollianos a la sustituibilidad de las leyes lógicas.

Abstract I propose that Quine’s Carrollian argument in “Truth by Convention” does not refute an especially genuine variety of conventionalism about logic. I also argue that the basic Carrollian lesson about conventionalism is that the introduction of accepted conventions or theses about what is logically correct cannot by itself create the corresponding inferential dispositions. Based on my discussion of the Carrollian regress, I finally indicate that there are at least certain Carrollian limits to the way in which the “logical laws” could be “replaced” and, contrary to some of Alberto Moretti’s considerations, that there are also other not strictly Carrollian limits to the replaceability of logical laws.

Abstract Axel Barceló has extended the objectivist apparatus for handling color terms that I develop in my book Roads to Reference, so that the extension covers also some aesthetic predicates. In this note I argue that Barceló’s extension probably attempts to go too far.

Abstract According to Ricardo Mena, a demonstrative refers to all the objects that the utterer has an intention for it to refer to, which may be more than one in cases where her referential intentions conflict. In this note I argue that Mena’s proposal has several serious problems.

Abstract Eleonora Orlando argues that one must understand some descriptivist theories of names that I criticize in my book Roads to Reference as ceteris paribus generalizations, and that on this understanding they survive my criticisms; she also introduces some doubts about my views on the knowledge speakers have of the reference-fixing conventions I postulate for proper names. In this note I argue against Orlando’s suggestion about ceteris paribus provisos and explain my view of the epistemology of reference-fixing conventions.

Abstract Luis Fernández Moreno has given a number of arguments that descriptive knowledge or stipulations have a greater role in the fixing of the reference of natural kind terms than I allow in my book Roads to Reference. In this note I criticize Fernández Moreno’s arguments.

Abstract My proposed mechanism of reference fixing for ordinary natural kind terms in the book Roads to Reference appeals to the ordinary notion of substance. In this note I reply to an objection by Martín Abreu Zavaleta that that notion is too vague to allow for a sufficiently constrained property to become the referent of a given ordinary substance term. I argue that the notion of substance is far less vague than Abreu Zavaleta claims.

Abstract Melisa Vivanco objects to my theory of the Arabic numerals in Roads to Reference that the reference fixing procedure that I postulate doesn’t exploit the morphological structure of the Arabic numerals, but it should. Against Vivanco, I argue that the procedure in question does exploit the morphological structure of the numerals in an essential way.

Abstract Thainá Demartini has criticized my view that ordinary natural kind terms refer to vague non-scientific kinds and defended the more traditional view that they refer to precise kinds discovered by science. In this note I reject Demartini’s worries as based on inadequate ontological scruples.

Abstract Filipe Martone argues that reference-fixing intentions where the intended object is represented by means of a description can never fix the reference of a demonstrative, and that a speaker, as a matter of empirical fact, never has simultaneous perceptual and non-perceptual reference-fixing intentions that she can intend as fixing the reference of a demonstrative. In this note I reject Martone’s arguments for these claims.

Abstract Matheus Valente presents a number of examples designed to show that my theory of reference fixing for demonstratives violates the desideratum that demonstrative thoughts should be transparent to speakers. In this note I argue that the alleged desideratum is not really such and defend my theory against other criticisms made by Valente.

Abstract I explore an argument for epistemic non-factualism, the thesis that epistemic attributions do not describe facts. The argument is analogous to but independent of Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s argument for non-factualism about rule-following. Some objections to the two arguments are considered and rejected, in particular accusations of incoherence and “reductivism”. The epistemic argument and a “skeptical solution” to it are argued to be part of Wittgenstein’s conception in On Certainty.

Resumen Exploro un argumento en defensa del antifactualismo epistémico, la tesis de que las atribuciones epistémicas no describen hechos. El argumento es análogo a, pero independiente de, el argumento del Wittgenstein de Kripke en defensa del antifactualismo acerca de las atribuciones de seguir una regla. Considero y rechazo varias objeciones a los dos argumentos, en particular las acusaciones de incoherencia y “reductivismo”. Sostengo que el argumento epistémico y una “solución escéptica” suya son parte de la concepción de Wittgenstein en Sobre la certeza.